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SAMMANFATTNING 
Infektiösa patogener som påvisats i en population för första gången, alternativt uppvisar en 
ökning i incidens eller geografisk spridning, utgör ett allvarligt framtida hot för såväl 
människor som djur. Majoriteten av dessa patogener orsakar endast mindre hälsoproblem, 
men risken att nästa stora pandemi kan vara nära i antågande får ej försummas. Detta 
illustreras tydligt av HIV, som på relativt kort tid har etablerat sig som en av världens mest 
fruktade infektiösa agens. Patogenerna av denna typ antas sällan vara nyutvecklade, utan 
förmodas oftast ha förekommit tidigare i naturen. De allra flesta är zoonotiska och därmed 
kapabla att infektera andra arter utöver människa. Virus är överrepresenterade, vilket dels 
antas bero på svårigheterna i att behandla och kontrollera virala sjukdomar, såväl som den 
enorma genetiska mångfald som virus uppvisar. Än så länge har ingen tydlig association 
kunnat påvisas mellan ett virus zoonotiska status och dess benägenhet att nyinfektera 
människor. Men eftersom en betydande andel trots allt innehar förmågan att infektera djur 
utöver människa, eller har haft historiskt, är det sannolikt att zoonotiska virus är en av de 
patogengrupper som utgör störst risk för framtiden. 
 
Eftersom många av de patogener som påvisats i humana populationer för första gången, 
alternativt uppvisar en ökning i incidens eller geografisk spridning, är sprungna ur 
djurpopulationer, kan överföringen av mikroorganismer från djur till människa antas spela en 
central roll. Troligen exponeras människan ständigt för främmande patogener, men endast ett 
mindre antal av dessa kommer att inneha de rätta genetiska förutsättningarna för att kunna 
orsaka mänsklig infektion. Av dessa är det troligen bara ett fåtal som kommer att utveckla 
förmågan att spridas mellan människor, varav endast en fraktion lyckas förfina detta till den 
grad att de kan skapa humana pandemier. Denna övergång från djurinfektion till human 
pandemi sker anmärkningsvärt ofta i områden som står under antropogen påverkan. Vissa av 
dessa aktiviteter förmodas verka genom att utöka exponeringen av människor för nya 
patogener, dess reservoarer eller vektorer, andra genom att underlätta spridning i 
populationen. För att mänskligheten i framtiden ska kunna förhålla sig till hotet som dessa 
infektiösa patogener utgör, finns det stora behov av forskning inom flera områden. Eftersom 
processen är komplex och multifaktoriell är en multidisciplinär och internationellt samordnad 
angreppsmetod ofta att rekommendera. 
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SUMMARY 
Emerging infectious diseases poses a great future threat, not only to humans but also to 
domestic animals and wildlife. Even though the majority of these infections only cause minor 
health problems, the relatively recent emergence of HIV clearly illustrates that the next major 
human pandemic may surface at any time. Regardless of what the name indicates, most 
emerging human pathogens are not believed to be recently evolved, but to have existed 
previously in the natural environment. Most emerging pathogens are zoonotic, i.e. able to 
infect animals besides humans. Viruses are significantly overrepresented, which is thought to 
be due to the general difficulties in treating and controlling viral diseases, as well as the 
substantial amount of genetic diversity that viruses exhibits. Even though there is no clear 
association between the classification of a virus as zoonotic and its’ risk of emergence, many 
emerging viruses have been shown to be zoonotic or have a zoonotic history. Therefore it is 
probably accurate to conclude that zoonotic viruses constitute a significant risk for future 
emergence events. 
 
Since the majority of emerging pathogens are zoonotic, the process of cross-species 
transmission of a microbe from its reservoir to humans is likely to play a central role. It is 
probable that humans are exposed to unfamiliar pathogens regularly, but that only a few of 
them will possess the required genetic features to successfully cause human infection. A 
fraction of these pathogens may go on to acquire the ability to transmit between humans, 
whereof an additional few may evolve to transmit at a rate that enables major epidemics. 
When emergence occurs, it appears to disproportionately often happen in areas that are 
affected by anthropogenic activities. Some of these activities are believed to act by 
augmenting exposure of humans to novel pathogens, reservoirs or vectors, others by 
enhancing disease transmission. In order to be prepared for future emergence events, there is a 
great need for additional research on numerous aspects of the emergence process. Also, given 
the complexity and multifactorial nature of disease emergence, a multidisciplinary and 
internationally conjunctive approach is often advised. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Infectious diseases have a long history of being one of mankind’s greatest nemeses. Today, 
infectious diseases are the second biggest contributor to worldwide mortality, only surpassed 
by ischemic heart disease (WHO, 2004). While plagues from the past continue to tantalize 
human populations, and despite improvements in diagnostics and treatment methods, new 
infections appear to be emerging at an unprecedented rate (Jones et al., 2008). Also, it is 
becoming increasingly obvious that anthropogenic activities, such as deforestation, intensive 
agriculture and encroachment on previously unoccupied habitats, play a central role in the 
emergence process (Antia et al., 2003; Institute of Medicine, 1992; Morse et al., 2012; Parrish 
et al., 2008; Schrag et al., 1995; Wolfe et al., 2005; Woolhouse et al., 2007).  
 
The majority of emerging pathogens have been shown to be of viral origin, and characteristics 
such as having broad host ranges seem to facilitate the process (Cleaveland et al., 2001; 
Taylor et al., 2001; Woolhouse et al., 2005a). The purpose of this paper is to briefly analyze 
why viruses are more likely to emerge than other taxonomic groups, as well as review how 
different characteristics, such as zoonotic status and routes of transmission, influences the 
process. Also, since many emerging viruses are zoonotic or have a zoonotic history 
(Woolhouse et al., 2005b), the process of viral transition from solely infecting animals to 
causing human pandemics, will be analyzed. Last but not least, risk factors for viral 
emergence will briefly be summarized. Although the focus is set on zoonotic viruses, a 
substantial proportion of presented facts are also applicable to other categories of emerging 
pathogens. 
 
METHODS 
By using the search words emerging, zoono* and virus* in the databases Scopus and Web of 
Science, original articles and reviews where accessed. Moreover, the reference lists where 
used to further extend the search. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Background 
An emerging disease is caused by a pathogen that has appeared in a population for the first 
time, or that has existed previously but is increasing in incidence or in geographic range 
(WHO, 2014). Sometimes reemerging diseases are included in this concept, which are those 
that previously showed decreased incidence but now again is experiencing an upsurge (Morse, 
1995), often due to failing public health measures (Institute of Medicine, 1992; Morse et al., 
2005) or antimicrobial resistance (Jones et al., 2008). Despite what the name may indicate, 
emerging infectious pathogens are usually not believed to be recently evolved, but to have 
existed previously in nonhuman reservoirs (Morse et al., 1990). The majority of research is 
concentrated on emerging human diseases, but the concept of pathogen emergence is also 
becoming increasingly recognized as threats to domestic animals and wildlife (Cleaveland et 
al., 2001; Woolhouse, 2002).  
 
Approximately one eight of the currently known human pathogens are classified as emerging, 
whereof about ¾ are considered to be zoonotic. Overall, zoonotic pathogens have been shown 
to be approximately twice as likely to emerge as non-zoonotic pathogens (Cleaveland et al., 
2001; Taylor et al, 2001; Woolhouse et al., 2005a). About 40% of the emerging pathogens are 
of viral origin, which makes viruses the biggest contributor of all the pathogenic groups. 
Viruses have also been shown to be significantly more probable to emerge than other 
taxonomic orders (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor et al., 2001; Woolhouse et al., 2005a). 
Also, viruses are significantly overrepresented in the group of pathogens that were discovered 
after the 1980s, constituting approximately ⅔ of the total number. This is a significant 
overrepresentation, since viruses still only make up about 14% of human pathogens. 
Approximately three new viral species are discovered each year (Woolhouse et al., 2007), and 
extrapolating of the discovery curve indicates that there is still a substantial pool of 
undiscovered viruses out there (Woolhouse et al., 2012).  
 
So far there has yet to be demonstrated a connection between the classification of a virus as 
zoonotic, and its’ risk of emergence (Taylor et al., 2001; Woolhouse et al., 2005a). However, 
approximately ¾ of human viruses are zoonotic (Taylor et al., 2001) and many have a 
zoonotic history (Parrish et al., 2008). Famous examples of human viruses that either has a 
nonhuman reservoir or are believed to have originated in animals, include HIV-1 
(chimpanzees), HIV-2 (sooty mangabees), Influenza A (wildfowl), SARS (bats) and Measles 
and Smallpox (livestock) (Woolhouse et al., 2012). When taking this into consideration, it 
seems likely that the zoonotic pool is important for emerging viruses as well. 
 
Why are viruses especially prone to emerge? 
There are a few plausible explanations as to why an emerging pathogen is particularly likely 
to be of viral origin. One is that today there are few effective antivirals, making viral diseases 
more difficult to control and therefore also more likely to spread within a population 
(Cleaveland et al., 2001). Another possible explanation is the substantial amount of genetic 
diversity exhibited by viruses. This diversity is likely to be especially high in RNA-viruses, 
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due to their exceptional mutation rate, which in turn is because of the lack of proofreading 
ability of the RNA-polymerase (Quinn et al., 2011). This big genetic diversity enables viruses 
in general, and RNA-viruses in particular, to generate greater amounts of genetic diversity, 
and are thereby more likely to adapt to a new host (Woolhouse et al., 2001). 
 
If studied numerically, RNA-viruses appear to be more probable to emerge than DNA-
viruses. RNA-viruses constitute approximately 37% of all emerging pathogens, which makes 
them the biggest contributor (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Woolhouse et al., 2005a). Also, the 
fraction of RNA-viruses among emerging disease agents appear to be increasing. Since the 
1980s, RNA-viruses have been shown to account for more than 56% of newly discovered 
pathogens (Woolhouse et al., 2007). However, so far the importance of RNA-viruses has not 
been shown to be of statistical significance (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Woolhouse et al., 2005a). 
Also, no significant difference has been detected regarding different viral families and risks of 
emergence (Woolhouse et al., 2005a).  
 
In addition to mutations, viruses are also able to generate genetic change through 
recombination, or reassortment in viruses with segmented genomes. These processes enable 
the acquirement of multiple genetic changes in a short amount of time, as well as the 
combining of genomic sequences from different viruses (Parrish et al., 2008; Quinn et al., 
2011). Reassortment is thought to have played a vital role in the generation of the 1957 and 
1968 pandemic influenza strains (Ma et al., 2009).  
 
Viral transition from infecting animals to causing human pandemics  
The emergence of novel viruses can be described with the so called “pathogen pyramid”, 
containing four different levels. Some pathogens are prevented from transcending to the next 
stage by different barriers, for instance genetic maladaptation, lack of sufficient pathogen-host 
interaction etc. (Woolhouse et al., 2007). The number of transcending events between levels is 
believed to decrease further up the pyramid, while the consequences of events are believed to 
increase (Morse et al., 2012).  
 
 
Figure 1: The pathogen pyramid, containing 
four different levels. These levels get 
progressively smaller higher up the pyramid, 
which illustrates a decreasing number of 
transcending events. Arrows illustrate the 
possibility for some pathogens to transcend 
from one level to the next. Bars illustrate 
transcendence barriers for others. 
(From Woolhouse et al., 2012) 
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Level 1: Exposure of humans to the virus, either through direct contact, indirect contact or via 
vector. Exposure at this stage is often due to changes in human, animal or vector ecology, 
which affects the interaction frequency between man and virus. The only possible impediment 
at this stage is insufficient geographical overlap of reservoir, vector and human habitats 
(Woolhouse et al., 2007). Exposure of this kind is thought to be a frequent occurrence 
(Woolhouse et al., 2012). 
 
Level 2: The viruses at this level have successfully completed cross-over transmission to 
humans and are capable of causing infection. The ability to reach this level is partly 
determined by viral genetics, and/or partly by the physiology of the infected host, most 
notably immune status (Woolhouse et al., 2012). Some pathogens have an innate ability to 
infect humans, and can therefor enter the pyramid at level 2, without the need of preceding 
exposure (Morse et al., 2012). 
 
Level 3: These viruses can maintain shorter chains of transmission between humans. One 
critical requirement for this to occur is that the virus can access tissues from which it can exit 
the host, such as the urogenital tract, lower gut, skin, blood and the upper respiratory tract 
(Woolhouse et al., 2012).  
 
Level 4: The viruses that have reached this level are sufficiently transmissible to cause 
pandemics and/or become endemic in the human population, without the need for 
reintroductions from nonhuman reservoirs. The ability of a virus to transcend to this stage is 
not only related to viral genetics, but also to human demography and behavior, and its 
influence on transmission (Woolhouse et al., 2012). Pandemic spread is often aided by global 
travel of infected humans and the international movement of vectors and reservoir species 
(Morse et al., 2012). 
 
Out of the 219 viruses that are infective to humans, approximately 50% have reached stage 3, 
whereof about half have managed to reach level 4. Interestingly, this makes the shape of the 
pathogen pyramid remarkably different for viruses compared to other groups of pathogens, 
where much smaller fractions have reached level 4 and pandemic spread. One possible 
explanation is the quicker genetic evolution of viruses which gives them a greater ability to 
adapt to new hosts (Woolhouse et al., 2012). 
 
The correlation between R0 and outbreak size 
The extent of an outbreak of a zoonotic virus, or any other infectious pathogen, is dependent 
on the size of the susceptible population, the number of primary introductions, and R0, also 
known as the basic reproduction number (Woolhouse, 2002). R0 can be defined as the mean 
number of secondary cases of infection associated with every primary case, and is the sum of 
the products of the average contact rate between infectious and susceptible individuals, the 
probability of infection of a susceptible host, as well as the mean longevity of infection-time 
(Calisher et al., 2006). In order for a virus to successfully cause human pandemics, R0 needs to 
exceed one (Woolhouse et al., 2005b). For these pathogens, the final size of an outbreak is 
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chiefly determined by the size of the susceptible population (Woolhouse et al., 2005a). This 
category is likely to constitute the biggest threat for future emergence events (Woolhouse et 
al., 2005b). For viruses with a R0 of less than one, the size of an outbreak is primarily 
dependent on the number of successful introductions from the reservoir species (Woolhouse 
et al., 2005a). These viruses will probably only experience limited spread, e.g. only reach the 
third level of the pathogen pyramid (Woolhouse et al., 2007). 
  
Between these two, there is a transition state where viruses have an R0-value of around 
1.These viruses are believed to constitute a possible source of future emerging diseases. The 
final size of an outbreak of these pathogens is extremely sensitive to even the smallest 
changes in R0 (Woolhouse et al., 2005a). An increased R0-value can be achieved through for 
example increased proximity of the old and new host, increased host density, behavioral 
changes or genetic adaptation of the pathogen (Antia et al., 2003; Wolfe et al., 2005; 
Woolhouse et al., 2005b; Woolhouse et al., 2007). Risk factors are more extensively reviewed 
further down.  
 
The species jump 
Cross-species transmission is dependent on an intricate balance between viral genetics (i.e. 
ability to infect) and ecology (i.e. frequency of exposure) (Morse et al., 2012). It is likely that 
many animal viruses at some point will spill-over into humans, but then fail to establish itself 
due to an inadequate transmission potential. This process has been termed “viral chatter”, 
where pathogens are repeatedly spread from animals to humans, often without further 
transmission. This process have been hypothesized to be of great importance in the emergence 
of viruses, since it is believed to increase viral diversity and thereby also the probability of a 
virus evolving that is able to infect and spread within the human population (Wolfe et al., 
2005). The frequency of spill-over events is likely to depend predominantly on the frequency 
of contact between humans and reservoir, which in turn is largely regulated by geographic 
overlap of habitats and behavioral factors of the hosts (Parrish et al., 2008).  
 
In order for some viruses to successfully jump species, they are in need of an amplifier host, 
i.e. a species that increases transmission of the pathogen in question. They act by establishing 
a contact between pathogen and recipient host that otherwise would not occur, or by providing 
an opportunity for the microbe to adapt to humans. In the emergence of SARS it is believed 
that the virus spilled-over from fruit bats to civet cats in wild animal markets in Asia, 
followed by the establishment of a market cycle of infection. This is believed to have 
amplified virus load (Calisher et al., 2005) as well as enabled the virus to adapt to humans 
(Song et al., 2005).  
 
For Influenza A viruses, it is often hypothesized that domestic pigs serve as mixing vessels in 
which new infectious variants may be generated. This is due to the fact that avian, swine and 
human strains are all capable of infecting and replicating in cells of the respiratory tract of 
pigs, which permits reassortment and the possible generation of new virulent strains. If few or 
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none in the population previously have acquired immunity to the new strain, extensive 
pandemic spread and global disease may follow (Ma et al., 2009). 
 
Factors influencing viral emergence 
When studying the relative importance of taxonomy, transmission route and host range 
regarding its’ contribution to the risk of emergence, multifactorial analyses indicates that 
taxonomic division is the most important, and that broadness of host range also has great 
impact (Cleaveland et al., 2001).  
 
Multi host vs. single host pathogens 
Approximately 75% of emerging pathogens are zoonotic, and overall, multi host pathogens 
are about twice as likely to emerge as single host pathogens (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor 
et al., 2001; Woolhouse et al., 2005a). Also, the capability of infecting more than one 
taxonomic order has been shown to constitute another risk factor (Cleaveland et al., 2001). 
About 80% of the human pathogens that were discovered after the 1980s are zoonotic, and 
these microbes have been shown to be significantly more likely to be zoonotic compared to 
species detected earlier (Woolhouse et al., 2007). Also, human RNA-viruses have been shown 
to be zoonotic to a higher degree than human DNA-viruses (84% vs 36%) (Woolhouse, 
2002). This may to some extent explain why RNA-viruses numerically are a bigger 
contributor to emerging pathogens than DNA-viruses. 
 
Determinants of host range are poorly mapped, but for viruses there is a significant 
association between breadth of host range and the usage of phylogenetically conserved cell 
receptors. According to Woolhouse et al. (2012), there are no human viruses with broad host 
ranges that do not recognize and bind to phylogenetically conserved receptors. 
 
Importance of transmission route 
No clear association between different transmission routes and risk of emergence has been 
discovered. Numerically, the majority of the emerging viruses are transmitted by direct 
contact, followed by vector-borne transmission and indirect contact (Taylor et al., 2001). 
However, if the proportion of the number of emerging species is studied, the results look 
somewhat different (see table 1 below). 
 
Taxonomic division Zoonotic status Transmission route Proportion of 
emerging species 
Virus Zoonotic Indirect 0,459 
Virus Zoonotic Direct 0,413 
Virus Non-zoonotic Indirect 0,308 
Virus Non-zoonotic Direct 0,298 
Virus Zoonotic Vector-borne 0,293 
Table 1: Modified from Taylor et al. (2001) 
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Human vector-borne pathogens have been shown to be more likely to be zoonotic than 
pathogens transmitted by indirect contact. Pathogens transmitted by direct contact are the least 
likely to be zoonotic. This is hardly surprising, given the fact that generalist vectors often feed 
on numerous different species and are thereby producing an evolutionary incentive for 
pathogens to acquire the ability to infect multiple hosts. In comparison, direct transmission 
that requires close physical contact provides fewer opportunities for interspecies spread 
(Woolhouse et al., 2001). However, vector borne transmission may also cause additional 
constraints on the adaptability of a pathogen to new host-species. This is due to the need to 
balance fitness in three or more different species, i.e. the reservoir, the vector and the recipient 
host (Parrish et al., 2008). This hypothesis is supported by the findings of Taylor et al. (2008) 
where vector-borne pathogens in general were proven to be more likely to emerge than 
pathogens transmitted by other routes, while zoonotic pathogens transmitted via vector were 
shown to be less inclined to emerge (Taylor et al., 2001).  Despite this, a significant increase 
has been observed in the number of emerging pathogens transmitted by vectors. Since the 
1940s, vector-borne diseases have been responsible for 22,8% of emerging pathogens, and for 
28,8% from 1990-2000 (Jones et al., 2008).  
 
Reservoir species 
There are no clear correlations between the usage of different reservoir species and risk of 
emergence. Overall, mammals are associated with about 80% of emerging pathogens, birds 
with less than 20% and very few with other vertebrates (Woolhouse et al., 2012). If studied 
numerically, the most important reservoir hosts for emerging viruses are rodents, followed by 
ungulates, non-mammals (i.e. birds and invertebrates), primates and carnivores (Woolhouse et 
al., 2005a). For emerging pathogens in general, ungulates are the most important, followed by 
carnivores, rodents, primates and non-mammals (Cleaveland et al., 2001). In order for an 
animal to become an important reservoir of human infections, it either needs to be closely 
related phylogenetically to humans, i.e. primates, or experience frequent encounters with 
humans, i.e. rodents.  Notably, primates appear to be the source of approximately one fifth of 
the major human pathogens, despite their infrequent contact with man (Wolfe et al., 2007).  
 
Pathogens with reservoirs in wildlife have been shown to be especially likely to emerge, 
compared to the usage of reservoirs in domestic animals (Cleaveland et al., 2001). Since the 
1940s, almost 72% of zoonotic emerging pathogens appear to have originated in wildlife, and 
this trend show signs of steadily increasing over time (Jones et al., 2008).  
 
The importance of bats as reservoirs is becoming increasingly recognized (Calisher et al., 
2006; Drexler et al., 2011; Drexler et al., 2012; Smith et al., 2013). In the last two decades, 
bat borne viruses such as Nipah, Hendra, SARS and Ebola, have caused significant health 
burdens globally (Smith et al., 2013). Bats comprise more than one fifth, as well as some of 
the most ancient, mammalian species. This raises the hypothesis that viruses that have co-
evolved with bats may use cell receptors that subsequently have been conserved in other 
mammals, which in turn would enhance their transmission (Calisher et al., 2006). 
Additionally, bats live long lives, are widely dispersed globally and live at great population 
9 
 
 
 
densities. Also, bats are the only mammals capable of powered flight. These factors are all 
likely to enhance transmission of bat borne viruses (Calisher et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2013). 
 
Risk factors associated with the emergence of viruses 
Emergence of an infectious pathogen is usually precluded by one or several changes. These 
changes can crudely be subdivided into: changes in the ecology of host, pathogen or vector, 
genetic change of the pathogen, or genotypic or phenotypic change of the host, most notably 
immunosuppression. Ecologic changes act by altering the opportunity for transmission of a 
pathogen, for example through changed distribution or behavior of pathogen, vector or host 
(Woolhouse, 2002). Different risk factors operate on different parts of the emergence process. 
Some facilitates interaction between human and pathogen; others affect the disease-agents 
transmission within a population. Often a combination of drivers is needed for emergence to 
occur (Institute of Medicine, 1992; Woolhouse et al., 2012).  
 
Below in Table 2 follows risk factors commonly recognized in processes of disease 
emergence. Sometimes the term “drivers of emergence” is also used. Some of them are 
further explained in text below. 
 
 
Risk factor Specific examples Examples of viruses 
Changes of ecosystems and 
global warming 
Deforestation, agriculture, 
damming etc. 
Influenza A, Hantavirus, Rift 
Valley Fever virus,  
Nipah virus2 etc. 
Human demography Population growth, increased 
population density, 
urbanization, 
immunosuppression etc. 
Lassa fever virus, Yellow fever 
virus, Dengue fever virus etc. 
Human behavior Sexual activity, intravenous 
drug abuse, international travel, 
bushmeat consumption1 etc.  
Simian foamy virus1 Ebola 
virus1, HIV1,3, SARS4 etc. 
Technology and industry Nosocomial infections, 
antimicrobial resistance, 
international trade, food and 
water processing etc. 
Hepatitis B and C, Reston 
Ebola and Marburg Virus etc. 
Societal change  Overcrowding in cities, 
inadequate hygiene, breakdown 
of public health measures etc. 
Dengue fever, measles etc. 
 
Table 2: Risk factors associated with pathogen emergence, along with more specific examples of 
activities as well as examples of associated viruses.  
Adapted from the Institute of Medicine (1992) unless specified otherwise 
1 Wolfe et al. (2005) 
2 Chua et al. (2002) 
3Bengis et al. (2004)  
4Song et al. (2005) 
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Another factor that is believed to affect emergence of infectious diseases is genetic adaptation 
of the pathogen. This has been discussed previously in the text and is therefore not included in 
the table above. Also, genetic change of the host is another plausible explanation for disease 
emergence. However, this is more likely to constitute a problem in inbred populations of 
endangered species or domestic animals (Woolhouse et al., 2005b), and is therefore not 
included in the table above. 
 
There has been some debate regarding the relative importance of ecologic changes and 
genetic adaptation. The most common conclusion seems to be to assign ecologic factors, i.e. 
changes that affect how humans interact with their immediate surroundings, a leading role 
(Institute of Medicine, 1992; Morse, 1995; Schrag et al., 1995; Woolhouse et al., 2005b) 
 
Change of ecosystems and global warming 
Change of ecosystems is a wide concept that includes many different drivers, whereof one of 
the most frequently mentioned is changed land use. It has been shown that since the 1940s, 
almost 50% of the events of zoonotic pathogen emergence have resulted from changes in land 
use (Keesing et al., 2010). This concept includes for example deforestation, agriculture, 
modification of wetlands, dam construction etc. (Institute of Medicine, 1992). These drivers 
are believed to act by placing humans, reservoirs and vectors in increased proximity to one 
another (Institute of Medicine, 1992; Patz et al., 2004). Some may also affect wildlife 
habitats, which in turn will increase contact frequency between humans and wildlife 
pathogens (Patz et al., 1994). The fact that since the 1940s almost 75% of emerging zoonotic 
pathogens originated in wildlife, and that this trend appears to be significantly increasing over 
time, supports the hypothesis that human activities that increases contact with pathogens of 
wildlife, are substantial risk factors for disease emergence (Jones et al., 2008). Processes such 
as damming and irrigation water in agriculture, are likely to promote vector-borne disease 
agents since many vectors breed in standing water (Morse, 1995). Also, recent information 
suggests that activities that contribute to reducing biodiversity in flora and fauna also may 
increase transmission of infectious pathogens via different mechanisms (Keesing et al., 2010). 
 
The influences of global warming on the emergence of infectious diseases have yet to be fully 
elucidated. The survival of pathogens outside their hosts, as well as the seasonality of viruses 
such as Influenza A, is likely to be affected by climate change. Pathogens transmitted by 
vectors are also expected to be affected in different ways. First of all, higher global 
temperatures may increase the areas of habitats suitable for breeding. Secondly, an increased 
precipitation and a subsequent rise in sea level may positively affect vectors that are 
dependent on water to complete their life cycles (Institute of Medicine, 1992). The fact that a 
significant increase in the importance of vector borne transmission has been observed, and 
that it has been correlated to climate anomalies, may be regarded as supports to this 
hypothesis (Jones et al., 2008).  
 
11 
 
 
 
Human demographic changes 
Increased population size and density is often hypothesized to play an important role in the 
emergence of many infectious diseases (Institute of Medicine, 1992). This hypothesis is 
supported by a study performed by Jones et al. (2008) where human population density was 
found to be a significant predictor for disease emergence. Urbanization is another important 
factor, which acts by allowing isolated pathogens to gain foothold in larger population. This is 
thought to have played a vital role in the emergence of HIV/ADIS (Morse, 1995). 
 
There are also reasons to believe that opportunistic infections in an increasingly 
immunocompromised population, may threaten future human populations. Life expectancy in 
most notably the western world is steadily rising, while malnutrition continues to impair 
immune defenses in the developing world. The HIV-pandemic as well as hospital treatments 
in association with cancer or organ transplantation, are also important factors to take into 
consideration (Institute of Medicine, 1992). Immunocompromised hosts living at high density 
may enable ill-adapted human pathogens to evolve into transmissible agents, first to the 
immunodeficient host and then to immunocompetent humans (Weiss et al., 2004).  
 
Human behavior 
Human behavior is a vital component for emergence of many infectious diseases, and 
therefore changing patterns of human activities is often important to halt epidemics (Institute 
of Medicine, 1992; Morse et al., 2012). Human consumption of bushmeat is believed to 
constitute an important factor in the emergence of several infectious diseases. It places 
humans in close contact with not only live animals and vectors, but also with body fluids 
during butchering of the carcasses (Karesh et al., 2009)(Wolfe et al., 2005). Also, 
transportation, sale and consumption may put humans at additional risk. HIV/AIDS is 
believed to initially have spilled-over to humans via this route (Wolfe et al., 2005). 
 
International travel and trade are two other key components in disease emergence, enabling 
pathogens to spread globally and thereby reach level 4 on the pathogen pyramid (Morse et al., 
2012). 
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DISCUSSION 
According to the findings of this review, the typical emerging pathogen is of viral origin and 
infects multiple host species, often in different taxonomic groups (Cleaveland et al., 2001; 
Taylor et al., 2001; Woolhouse et al., 2002). No clear association has been found between the 
risk of emergence and different routes of transmission, or usage of specific reservoir species, 
but the importance of vector-borne transmission and reservoirs in wildlife appear to be 
increasing (Jones et al., 2008). Also, emergence seems to disproportionately often occur in 
areas afflicted by human activities (Antia et al., 2003; Institute of Medicine, 1992; Morse et 
al., 2012; Parrish et al., 2008; Schrag et al., 1995; Wolfe et al., 2005; Woolhouse et al., 2007). 
So far no association has been found between the ability of a virus to infect multiple species 
and the risk of emergence, even though this is a common characteristic for emerging 
pathogens overall (Taylor et al., 2001; Woolhouse et al., 2005a). However, this may be due to 
lack of data on viral host ranges, since we in general know less about viruses than other types 
of pathogens (Morse et al., 2012). 
 
The fact that the majority of emerging pathogens are zoonotic, i.e. infects multiple hosts, is a 
cause of concern. Single host pathogens tend to evolve to an optimum level of virulence, 
determined by the trade-off between virulence and transmissibility (Woolhouse et al., 2001). 
For example, a virus may evolve towards a state of fewer health implications in order to 
increase the time when the host is infective to others. Unfortunately, this may not be the case 
for multi host pathogens. Here, virulence is likely to vary between different host species, and 
the addition of a new species can both increase and decrease virulence in previous hosts. Also, 
if the new host does not contribute to the overall fitness of the pathogen, there will be no 
constraints on virulence in that host (Woolhouse et al., 2001). This may explain the high 
virulence of for example Ebola virus, Nipah virus and SARS in humans (Woolhouse et al., 
2007). An additional cause of concern regarding emerging pathogens is the possible lack of 
evolutionary time for a specific pathogen to evolve optimal virulence in humans (Woolhouse 
et al., 2001). 
 
Research on pathogen emergence may be affected by biases at numerous stages. First of all, 
when analyzing traits such as taxonomic grouping, broadness of host range and transmission 
route, it is important to remember that these factors are non-independent and therefore also 
likely to be confounded. For example, the highest proportion of emerging species has been 
found in viruses that are classified as zoonotic and transmitted indirectly (Taylor et al., 2001). 
However, it has also been shown that zoonotic pathogens are relatively likely to be spread by 
indirect contact (Woolhouse et al., 2001). This makes it more difficult to draw clear 
conclusion on the importance of indirect transmission for emerging viruses. Biases may also 
affect studies of risk factors for emergence. This is because the process of identifying drivers 
is inevitably subjective (Woolhouse et al., 2005a), and there are very few ways to test the 
accuracy of proposed hypotheses. Also, the emergence of a pathogen is often due to the 
conjoint efforts of several drivers, many of whom are facilitating emergence indirectly 
(Institute of Medicine, 1992; Woolhouse et al., 2012). This makes it difficult to not only draw 
conclusions regarding individual drivers, but also to test their relative importance.  
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The classification of a pathogen as emerging may also be subjectively affected, reflecting the 
specific interests of the researcher. Also, the number of emergence events may be affected by 
improved diagnostics, as well as recent discoveries of the aetiological agents of old diseases 
(Woolhouse, 2002).  Moreover, the studies presented here that analyzes how different 
characteristics affect the probability of pathogen emergence (Cleaveland et al., 2001; Taylor 
et al., 2001; Woolhouse et al., 2005a) are all basing their studies at species level. This means 
that diversity at subspecies level, which for some pathogen families is substantial, is 
overlooked (Woolhouse et al., 2007). However, if subspecies are included in the analysis, 
there is a risk of biases due to phylogenetic relatedness of subspecies rich organisms (Taylor 
et al., 2001). 
 
There is a great need of additional research on the subject of emerging infectious pathogens. 
Considerable progress has been made, but we still lack crucial knowledge on several steps in 
the emergence process.  For example, we are in need of additional knowledge on the diversity 
of pathogens that humans are currently exposed to, or risk exposure to in the future. This 
makes surveys of the pathogen burden of most notably mammalian species, a future necessity 
(Woolhouse et al., 2007). Also, there is a need for additional research on genetic markers that 
are associated with an increased risk of emergence. For viruses, the usage of different cell 
receptors and how it affects the probability of emergence is something that needs further 
illuminating (Woolhouse et al., 2007). We also need to increase our understanding of how 
pathogen virulence is determined in different hosts. Today we know very little about why 
some pathogens are benign in their natural host but causes fatal diseases in other species 
(Morse et al., 2012). To get a better understanding of the complex, multifactorial process of 
pathogen emergence, a lot of knowledge can be gained through studying previous successful 
emergence events, and attempt to dissect its’ epidemiological and evolutionary patterns 
(Morse et al., 2012). 
 
Emergence of pathogens is not a straight forward process, as it often involves several different 
drivers (Institute of Medicine, 1992; Woolhouse et al., 2012). Therefore, in order to properly 
take on the problem of emerging infectious pathogens, a multidisciplinary approach is often 
advised (Morse et al., 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005; Woolhouse, 2002; Woolhouse et al., 2007). 
Microbiologists are needed to monitor genetic diversity, research on genetic markers and find 
common attributes that characterizes pathogens with potential to cause major epidemics. 
Medical doctors and veterinarians are required to oversee general population health of 
humans and animals, as well as contribute to research with a medical viewpoint.  Also, a wide 
range of other professions are needed to further delineate crucial processes. Since emergence 
can be driven by a wide range of changes in demography, behavior, land use, public health 
etc., competence and knowledge in these areas are of great importance. 
 
Some may argue that it is foolish to focus on diseases that have yet to emerge, given the 
enormous health burdens caused by already established infections such as malaria and 
tuberculosis. However, if the relatively recent emergence of HIV is taken into consideration, a 
virus that in less than a generation has established itself as one of the world’s biggest killers, 
the magnitude of the risks imposed are highlighted. HIV proves that even though the vast 
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majority of emerging pathogens so far only causes minor health problems, there is an always 
present risk for new fatal diseases with extensive global spread, to develop (Woolhouse et al., 
2007). It is an issue of global, not regional, importance, since the rapid international 
movement of both humans and animals today enables swift spread of disease agents 
(Woolhouse et al., 2012). Given the fact that anthropogenic activities that are associated with 
disease emergence, for example deforestation and bushmeat consumption, continues to occur 
at an un-halted rate, it is likely that the emergence of infectious pathogens will trouble 
mankind also in the future (Woolhouse, 2002; Woolhouse et al., 2007).  
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